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Coast Guard Nighttime Boardings and the 
Fourth Amendment: United States v. Piner 
The Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing federal law on 
the high seas and waters subject to United States jurisdiction. 
Coast Guard duties include administering laws and promulgat- 
ing and enforcing regulations to promote safety at sea.' Pursu- 
ant to these law enforcement and safety responsibilities, con- 
gressional authorization has existed for almost two hundred 
years2 for the Coast Guard to board vessels and examine docu- 
ments without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a war- 
rant? This authority, presently codified at 14 U.S.C. section 
89(a), has consistently been upheld by the circuit courts of ap- 
peals that have considered its constitutionality.* The Fifth Cir- 
1. 14 U.S.C. 5 2 (1976). See also 46 U.S.C. § 1454 (1976). The National Safe Boating 
Act of 1971 grants the Coast Guard authority to require pleasure craft to install, carry, or 
use appropriate safety equipment and adhere to appropriate safety standards. 
2. See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 5 62,l  Stat. 175, where the First Congress created 
the Revenue Cutter Service. Section 31 of the Act empowered officers of the Revenue 
Cutter Service "to go on board of ships or vessels in any part of the United States . . . 
for the purpose of demanding the manifests . . . and of examining and searching the said 
ships or vessels." Id. at 5 31. In 1915, Congress created the Coast Guard by merging the 
Revenue Cutter Service and the Lifesaving Service. Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 20, 38 Stat. 
800. 
3. 14 U.S.C. 5 89(a) (1976) provides: 
The Coast Guard may make inquries, examinations, inspections, searches, 
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United 
States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of viola- 
tions of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, 
and petty officers may a t  any time go on board of any vessel subject to the 
jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address in- 
quiries to those on board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and ex- 
amine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel 
compliance. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
See Note, High On the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth Amendment, and War- 
rantless Searches at Sea, 93 Hmv. L. REV. 725, 726-27 (1980). See also Carmichael, At 
Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51,65-75 (1977). Additional au- 
thority for Coast Guard boardings exists at 19 U.S.C. 5 1401(i) (1976) and 19 U.S.C. $! 
1581(a) (1976) (Coast Guard officers, as designated officers of customs, have full author- 
ity to board any vessel in the United States at any time to enforce applicable customs 
laws). 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35, 38 (4th Cir. 1980); United States 
v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1125 n.3 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979); 
United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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cuit, for example, sitting en banc, has held that Coast Guard 
boarding authority under section 89(a) is "plenary," and "need 
not be founded on any particularized su~picion."~ However, in 
United States u. Piner? the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lim- 
ited Coast Guard boarding authority by holding that a boarding 
of a pleasure craft after dark must (1) "be for cause, requiring at 
least a reasonable and articulable suspicion of noncompliance" 
with federal safety law or other federal laws, or (2) "be con- 
ducted under administrative standards so drafted that the deci- 
sion to search is not left to the sole discretion of the Coast 
Guard ~fficer."~ 
On January 12,1978, a Coast Guard vessel was conducting a 
routine law enforcement patrol on the waters of San Francisco 
Bay. At approximately 6:30 p.m. the Coast Guard crew spotted 
the running lights of defendants' forty-three foot sailboat, the 
"Delphene," and decided to conduct a routine boarding. The 
Coast Guard vessel identified itself, instructed the "Delphene" 
to prepare to be boarded, and placed a Coast Guard officer on 
the defendants' sailboat. The boarding Coastguardsman dis- 
played his credentials and advised the defendants that he was 
conducting a routine safety inspe~tion.~ Shortly thereafter, the 
Coast Guard boarding officer observed bags of marijuana in 
plain view. Both defendants were immediately placed under ar- 
rest, and their boat was seized. A subsequent search of their ves- 
5. United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1978). In this case the 
Coast Guard boardedm American shrimping vessel on the high seas without cause pur- 
suant to 14 U.S.C. 5 89(a). Circumstances developed which led the Coast Guard boarding 
team and treasury agents to have probable cause to search further and seize evidence of 
drug and currency violations. See also United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1086 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
6. 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979). 
7. Id. at 361. 
8. Id. at 359. Under applicable regulations, the safety inspection of a pleasure craft 
consists of the following: 
(1) Stopping and boarding of the boat. 
(2) Checking boat registration papers and personal identification of the 
boat owner. 
(3) Inspecting the boat for number, condition and storage of life jackets 
and fire extinguishers. 
(4) Inspecting the engine for backfire flame arrestor, closed compartments 
for proper ventilation ducts, and bilges for spilled oil or fuel to prevent explo- 
sion and fire. 
Id. 
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sel resulted in the recovery of over four thousand pounds of 
marijuana. The parties stipulated that the nighttime stop and 
boarding of the "Delphene" was for a routine safety inspection, 
that it was a random stop and boarding, and that there were no 
suspicious circumstances. Defendants were indicted for import- 
ing marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, 
and conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana-all in viola- 
tion of federal law.' 
Defendants moved to suppress the seized marijuana on the 
ground that the evidence was the fruit of a search prohibited by 
the fourth amendment.1° The district court held that the Coast 
Guard boarding was an unreasonable random administrative in- 
spection.ll The judge found that there was no suspicion for the 
boarding and that there was no administrative warrant, or its 
equivalent, restraining the discretion of the inspecting officer. 
Thus, the district court granted defendants' motion and sup- 
pressed the seized marijuana.12 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision 
two to one? The majority relied on the United States Supreme 
Court decision of Delaware u. Rouse,14 which held that the ran- 
dom stop of an automobile by state police for a driver's license 
and registration check was an unreasonable intrusion on the au- 
tomobile travelers and therefore violated the fourth amend- 
ment? The Piner majority noted that Prouse requires that 
"[tlhe permissibility of a particular law-enforcement practice 
[be] judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate govern- 
mental interests."le 
The government sought to distinguish Piner from Prouse by 
9. Id. 
10. United States v. Piner, 452 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The fourth 
amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef- 
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma- 
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
11. United States v. Piner, 452 F. Supp. 1335, 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
12. Id. at 1339-41. 
13. 608 F.2d at 358, 361. 
14. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See 608 F.2d at 360-61. 
15. 440 U.S. at 663. 
16. 608 F.2d at 360 (quoting from Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654). 
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arguing that Prouse-approved roadblocks17 are not practicable 
and that Coast Guard boardings are more productive and rea- 
sonable than automobile spot checks.18 Additionally, the govern- 
ment pointed out that Coast Guard boardings promote impor- 
tant governmental safety interests, have been historically 
accepted, and are now covered by regulations.lS The court recog- 
nized the forcefulness of the government's contentions and as- 
sumed, arguendo, that governmental interests in securing com- 
pliance with safety regulations outweighed the intrusion of 
privacy encountered in the ordinary daytime boarding. At night- 
time, however, the court believed that because of an enhanced 
"subjective intrusion," the individual privacy interests out- 
weighed the governmental intere~ts.'~ Subjective intrusion was 
defined by the Supreme Court in Prollse as "the generating of 
concern or even fright on the part of lawful  traveler^."^^ The 
Piner majority applied this concept as follows: 
If the stop of an automobile upon a public highway by an iden- 
tifiable police car is felt to create such subjective intrusion as 
to require the use of potentially less intrusive alternatives, 
surely the stop of an isolated boat after dark, followed by a 
physical intrusion upon the boat itself, would have an unset- 
tling effect immeasurably greater, placing a far greater demand 
upon the government to come forward with balancing factors. 
If the purpose of the random stop is to ascertain and dis- 
courage noncompliance with safety regulations, we see no rea- 
son why this purpose cannot suflticiently be accomplished dur- 
ing the daylight hours. Thus, reliance on this less intrusive 
means eliminates the need for stops and boardings after dark 
where no cause to suspect noncompliance exists.gg 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court order sup- 
pressing the seized marij~ana?~ 
Judge Kennedy dissented, offering four reasons to reverse 
17. Prouse expressly approved the use of roadblocks as a less-intrusive alternative 
to random stops. 440 U.S. at 663. 
18. See 608 F.2d at 361. "It appears from the record that in 1977, 330,534 pleasure 
craft were registered in the San Francisco Bay area and 3,245 were boarded by the Coast 
Guard, of which 40 per cent were found not to be in compliance with safety regulations." 
Id. at 361 n.2. 
19. Id. at 361. 
20. Id. 
21. 440 U.S. at 656 (quoting from United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
558 (1976)). 
22. 608 F.2d at 361 (emphasis added). 
23. Id. 
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the district court decision. First, Prouse was not dispositive of 
the constitutionality of Coast Guard boardings because 
"[rlandom safety checks of vessels by the Coast Guard present 
considerations very different from random automobile stops" 
and require a different rule.24 Second, the majority's "less-intru- 
sive" daytime-only-boarding alternative was impractical." 
Third, because of the historical acceptance of Coast Guard 
boarding authority under 14 U.S.C. section 89(a), "vessels are 
not entitled to the same fourth amendment protections as their 
landlocked  counterpart^."^^ Fourth, Coast Guard boardings fall 
within an exception to the fourth amendment for reasonable ad- 
ministrative searches and invade no legitimate expectation of 
privacy.a7 
The Piner majority inadequately analyzed the competing 
interests involved in nighttime Coast Guard boardings, thereby 
creating a distorted daytime-nighttime distinction. Two criti- 
cisms of the court's approach are offered: First, there is no more 
subjective intrusion inherent in a nighttime boarding than in a 
daytime boarding; second, the governmental interest in safety is 
greater at night when navigation is more dangerous. 
There is no more subjective intrusion inherent in a night- 
time boarding than in a daytime boarding. Piner reasoned that 
if an automobile stop creates such subjective intrusion as to re- 
quire less instrusive alternatives, then "surely" a nighttime stop 
of an isolated vessel and subsequent physical intrusion creates 
even more subjective intrusion.28 However, the court failed to of- 
fer any reasons to support this assertion. Although it is difficult 
to know whether boat operators are in fact more frightened by a 
random boarding at night than in the day, there is little reason 
to suppose that they would be. Day and night boardings share 
24. Id. at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 363-64. This view was asserted in a concurrence by Justices Brandeis and 
Holmes: 
There is no limitation upon the right of the sovereign to seize without a war- 
rant vessels registered under its laws, similar to that imposed by the common 
law and the Constitution upon the arrest of persons and upon seizure of "pa- 
pers and effects." 
Id. (quoting Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 524 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
27. Id. at 364. 
28. 608 F.2d at 361. 
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the same scope of limited physical intrusion: a boarding officer's 
reasonable discretion to conduct safety checks generally extends 
only to the boat owner or operator, and there is generally no 
need for other passengers to be disturbed." Boardings at  night 
do not "raise the specter of uniformed officers rousing people 
from their sleep . . . [because] where the boat is underway, it is 
clear that someone is, or ought to be, awake."a0 Hence, there is 
as much assurance at night as there is in the daytime that a 
Coast Guard boarding will be a reasonable, limited, foreseeable, 
routine inspecti~n.~' Moreover, vessels, unlike automobiles, have 
historically traveled the sea in totally isolated conditions-often 
traveling for many days and nights. A boat's isolation after dark 
does not, as the court contended, make subjective intrusion 
greater since boats are usually just as isolated during the 
daytime. 
Additionally, Piner failed to recognize that the governmen- 
tal interest in safety may be greater at  night, when navigation is 
more dangerous. Coast Guard safety regulations apply whenever 
a vessel is in use-day or night." The Piner majority felt en- 
forcement of these safety regulations could "sufEciently be ac- 
complished during daylight hours."aa However, the danger to the 
boating public of loss of life and property would likely be in- 
creased by a law enforcement scheme that severely limited au- 
thority to detect violations at  night." Willful violators could eas- 
ily avoid Coast Guard safety enforcement by departing patrolled 
waters before light and returning after dark, or simply by con- 
ducting all boating at night. Daytime-only boardings are imprac- 
tical and preclude effective nighttime safety enforcement when 
visibility is lowest and navigation potentially more dangerous.s6 
If, as the Piner court assumed, governmental interests in ordi- 
nary daytime boardings outweigh the intrusion on an individ- 
ual's fourth amendment interests, then equal or stronger govern- 
mental interests outweigh the intrusion in a nighttime boarding 
29. See id. at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEP'T 
OF TRANSPORTATION, B ARDING MANUAL 3-3, 3-5 (1977) (Coast Guard boating safety in- 
spection boardings are directed at the owner or operator of a vessel) [hereinafter cited as 
BOARDING MANUAL]. 
30. 608 F.2d at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
31. See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1980). 
32. 608 F.2d at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See 46 U.S.C. § 1461(c) (1976). 
33. 608 F.2d at 361. 
34. See id. at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
35. See id. 
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as well. Since the Piner daytime-nighttime boarding distinction 
is untenable, the court's decision to limit Coast Guard boarding 
authority is sound only if fourth amendment privacy interests 
outweigh government interests in all Coast Guard boardings. 
Moreover, Rouse held "only that persons in automobiles on 
public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel 
and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police 
 officer^."^ This holding protects the fourth amendment rights of 
persons in automobiles but does not establish a rule against all 
random stops.s7 There are at least three important differences 
between vessels and their landlocked counterparts which indi- 
cate that random vessel stops are reasonable even though ran- 
dom automobile stops are not? 
First, random boardings are the only practicable means of 
enforcing the governmental interest in boating safety. While the 
police may constitutionally enforce automobile safety laws by 
roadblocks and annual safety inspections, these alternatives to 
random stops are not available to the Coast Guard? "Road- 
blocks" at sea are impractical because vessels traveling on the 
oceans must constantly contend with changing sea, wind, cur- 
rent, and oceanographic conditions." Additionally, since vessel 
safety equipment (life preservers, fire extinguishers, etc.) is re- 
movable and safety regulations for boats apply only when a ves- 
sel is in use, periodic dockside boat inspections are ineffective? 
Second, random automobile spot checks are not "sufficiently 
productive to qualify as a reasonable law-enforcement prac- 
ti~e,"~' but random boating "safety checks are a highly effective 
36. 440 U.S. at 663. 
37. Rouse noted, "Nor does our holding today cast doubt on the permissibility of 
roadside truck weigh stations and inspection checkpoints, at  which some vehicles may be 
subject to further detention for safety and regulatory inspection than are others." 440 
U.S. at 663 11.26. See also id. at 663-64 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(Rouse does not fore- 
close roadblock stops, every-tenth-car stops, and random inspections by game wardens). 
38. "[Tlhe substantial differences between a vessel and a landlocked vehicle . . . 
preclude any assumption that the cases defining what is reasonable on the land automat- 
ically control the question of what is reasonable on the . . . sea." United States v. Wil- 
liams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1084 (5th Cir. 1980). 
39. See 608 F.2d at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. Vessel operators could meet requirements for an annual inspection and still 
violate safety regulations by operating their vessel without required equipment or with 
defective equipment. But see Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth 
Amendment, and Warrantless Searches a t  Sea, 93 Hmv. L. REV. 725, 743-51 (1980) 
(recommending a regular mandatory dockside vessel inspection program). 
42. 608 F.2d at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referring to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
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means of discovering safety  violation^."^^ Judge Kennedy noted 
in his dissent that of the 3,245 pleasure vessels boarded in the 
San Francisco Bay area in 1977, the Coast Guard found forty 
percent to be in violation of safety regulations." Thus, the pro- 
ductiveness of Coast Guard boardings qualifies them as a rea- 
sonable practice. 
Third, the court failed to recognize that Prouse was decided 
in the context of law enforcement officers pursuing governmen- 
tal interests without "any standards, guidelines, or proce- 
d u r e ~ . " ~ ~  The contrary was true in  pine^.^^ Coast Guard regula- 
tions, instructions, and training specifically caution boarding 
officers to exercise restraint and respect for the rights of persons 
on boarded vessels." The regulations require boarding officers 
"to interfere as little as possible with the movement of the ves- 
sels boarded."48 Coast Guard instructions emphasize the educa- 
tion of the recreational boater as well as enforcement of the law. 
Indeed, the concept of educating the boating public permeates 
the Coast Guard boarding program.4@ Hence, Coast Guard 
boarding officers serve a dual role: education and law enforce- 
ment. Additionally, Coast Guard policy allows only a few quali- 
fied officers to exercise boarding authority." Furthermore, Coast 
Guard instructions state the circumstances for conducting 
boardings: 
The purpose of boarding is the enforcement of boating 
safety laws. Sound discretion should be used to insure that ves- 
sels in legitimate trade, and those engaged in recreational pur- 
suits are not unnecessarily hampered in their movements or 
subject to unnecessary annoyance and interference by unrea- 
sonable exercise of authority. 
It is not possible to set forth hard and fast rules as to 
when and where to examine vessels. It is important that Coast 
Guard enforcement operations should be conducted in such a 
fashion that just cause for complaint is not given. 
The routine examination of documents, papers, and equip- 
U.S. at 659-61). 
Id. 
Id. 
440 U.S. at 650. 
See 608 F.2d at 361. 
See BOARDING MANUAL, supra note 29 at 1-1, 1-2, 3-1. 
Id. at 1-2. 
Id. at Letter of Promulgation. 
Id. at 1-2, 3-2. 
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ment in the enforcement of boating safety laws and regulations 
is best done when the vessel is boarded, is at anchor, or at a 
wharf. Vessels underway may be stopped, boarded, and 
examined.51 
Admittedly, Coast Guard regulations vest some discretion in 
boarding officers, but only because of the difficulty of creating 
"hard and fast rules" in the unique maritime setting." The 
Coast Guard's written instructions, training, and boarding officer 
qualification process are all part of a plan aimed squarely at pro- 
moting recreational boating safety through a joint enforcement 
and education policy. Because of these clear policies and objec- 
tives, the boarding in Piner was simply more reasonable than 
the stop in P ~ o u s e . ~ ~  
The Piner daytime-nighttime boarding distinction is unten- 
able. Nighttime boardings do not involve greater subjective in- 
trusion than daytime boardings. Moreover, increased dangers of 
nighttime navigation strengthen the government's interest in 
seeing that safety regulations are obeyed at least as consistently 
at night as they are during the day. Since the court implicitly 
concluded that daytime boardings are reasonable, the same re- 
sult should apply to nighttime boardings. Because of the untena- 
ble daytime-nighttime distinction and the significant differences 
between Piner and Prouse, the court should have held the Coast 
Guard's random nighttime boarding to be reasonable under the 
fourth amendment. 
D. Gary Beck 
51. Id. at  2-4. See also id. at 3-2 (vessels observed in unsafe operation or obvious 
violation of the law may be stopped and boarded). 
52. See Carmichael, At Sea With the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51, 
104 (1977). 
53. Additionally, a Coast Guard boarding officer who intentionally violates or fails to 
obey lawful orders and regulations or who is derelict in performing his duties may be 
punished by court-martial. 10 U.S.C. 892 (1976). Arguably, official sanctions could have 
been imposed on the Prouse policemen for violating verbal orders. Unlike the police in 
Prouse, however, the Coast Guard had written regulations, which are not readily suscep- 
tible to change, and an established plan for promoting safety through enforcement and 
education. 
